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Abstract 
This paper examines how government regulation in developing countries affects 
the form of corruption between business customers and service providers in the telecom 
sector. We match the World Bank enterprise-level data on bribes with a unique cross-
country telecom regulation dataset collected by Wallsten et al. (2004),  finding that 1) 
strong regulatory substance (the content of regulation) and regulatory governance reduce 
corruption; 2) competition and privatization reduces corruption; 3) the effects of 
regulatory substance on corruption control are stronger in countries with state-owned or 
partially state-owned telecoms, greater competition, and higher telecommunication fees; 
and 4) bureaucratic quality exert substitution effects to regulatory substance in deterring 
corruption. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory strategies that reduce information 
asymmetry and increase accountability tend to reduce illegal side-payments for 
connections. 
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Regulation and Corporate Corruption:   
New Evidence from the Telecom Sector 
1. Introduction 
The telecommunications industry has become one of the fastest-growing 
industries in many developing countries. It is also believed to provide substantial positive 
externalities to other businesses (Li and Xu, 2002). Roller and Waverman (2001) find 
that a country’s economic growth is positively related to its telecommunications 
infrastructure. However, corporate corruption, among many challenges facing public 
service institutions by developing countries, is one of the most pervasive and difficult 
ones to deal with.  
There is already a substantial literature on the determinants of corruption;
2
 
regulation is considered as an important factor that affects corruption (Stigler, 1971; 
Peltzman, 1976; Laffont and Tirole, 1991, 1993; Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer, 2002). However, in the telecommunications industry, corruption can take 
place in various forms, such as between telecommunications service providers and 
politicians, between telecom companies and the regulator, between telecom companies 
and companies from other sectors who want to obtain better services, and between 
service providers and service users (where the latter need to pay side-payments to get 
connected. Therefore, the effects of regulatory control on corruption may be different 
across different forms of corruption. For example, a regulator may have efficient control 
on service providers by controlling demand for bribes from customers; however, 
meanwhile service providers could use bribes to build up political ties in order to secure 
their profits despite the presence of a strict regulatory agency. In the former case, more 
regulation control is correlated with less corruption at the regulated firm level, but in the 
                                                 
2 See, for example, Treisman (2000), Svensson, (2003), Clarke and Xu (2004), Aidt, Dutta, and Sena (2006), Beck, 
Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006), Fan, Lin, and Treisman (2009), Barth, Lin, Lin, and Song (2009) and Anbarci, 
Escaleras, and Register (2009). In addition, Dreher, Kotsogiannis, and McCorriston (2006) employ a structural model 
by treating corruption as a latent variable to derive an index of corruption. 
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latter case, more regulation control could be correlated with more corruption at the 
political level. Recent work done by Estache and Wren-Lewis (2011) reviews the theories 
of corruption in regulated sectors and explains the many forms of corruption in sector 
governance and regulation. However, due to the complex relationships in the governance 
of telecommunications industry and associated data limitations for conducting studies,
3
 
there are still gaps in our empirical knowledge of these issues – to date, the impacts of 
government control on corporate corruption have rarely been empirically tested. In this 
paper, we aim to fill some gaps in the existing literature by focusing on whether the 
regulator as the third party can effectively limit the side-payments between telephone 
services providers and business customers.  
Certainly, a well-designed regulatory system can enhance corporate governance of 
regulated firms (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2006) and reduce their misconduct 
(such as fraud and requiring connection side-payments from their customers. If the 
government can create a countervailing institution which has the power to deter 
corruption and enforce penalties, regulatory control should be associated with less 
connection-facilitation payments. This outcome occurs because efficient regulatory 
control can provide credible threats to those service providers whose managers or 
installation staff request facilitation payments; at the same time, transparency promotes 
bargaining power for customers. Nonetheless, strong regulation may not necessarily 
reduce the demand for bribes because of the difficulty and complexity of combating this 
form of corruption. Especially in emerging countries, resource allocation is often shaped 
by political connection. Regulators with strong oversight powers may use their power to 
                                                 
3 Only a few studies have been performed, and these provide mixed evidence. For example, Djankov et al. (2002) 
find that countries with heavier regulation of entry (involving more procedures, costs, and delays in obtaining 
permission for entry) are associated with higher corruption levels. Beck et al. (2006) find that more supervisory power 
induces more corruption in bank lending while supervisory strategies that focus on forcing accurate information 
disclosure help reduce corruption in bank lending. Seim and Soreide (2009) find that corruption, when coupled with 
regulatory complexity, negatively affects performance in infrastructure sectors, including telecommunications.  
However, they use a general corruption index from the World Bank governance indicators, while we utilize micro-data 
from individual business users of telecommunications services - allowing more rigorous tests of the impacts of 
corruption.   
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induce noncompliant firms to divert resources to companies with political ties (Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 2006; Emerson, 2006, Houston, Lin and Ma, 2011). In such 
cases, the revenue sharing between politicians and utility companies may be catalysts for 
side-payments demand. As a result, it is important to know whether and to what extent 
regulatory control is efficient enough to control telecommunications connection-
facilitation payments. 
To answer these questions, we examine two aspects of government regulation in 
this paper:  regulatory governance and regulatory substance. Previous research usually 
focused on regulatory governance, which can be characterized by four elements: 
independence of the regulator, clarity of responsibility, accountability, and transparency 
and participation (Stern and Holder, 1999 and Gutièrrez, 2003). The present study also 
considers regulatory substance indicators: standardized regulatory tariff setting, quality of 
service standards, sufficient (but not excessive) accounting professionals, and periodic 
review procedures. Regulatory governance refers to the institutional and legal design of 
the regulatory system and the creation of the regulatory framework within which 
decisions are made. Regulatory substance refers to the actual decisions made by the 
regulator.
4
 The difference between regulatory substance and regulatory governance is that 
the former is the ―what of regulation‖ and the latter is the ―how of regulation.‖5  
Including a variable for regulatory substance is important for analyzing the control 
of corruption because this variable captures the extent to which the regulator is able to 
establish a reasonable tariff level and has compliance procedures for a minimum service 
standard. Detailed standards leave less leeway for service providers to exercise discretion 
towards their customers. In addition, regulatory substance also indicates whether the 
regulatory agency has enough auditing resources for monitoring performance and is in a 
                                                 
4 Levy and Spiller (1994, 1996) use the term ―regulatory incentives‖ to denote ―substance‖. 
5 Executive Summary, Handbook for Evaluating Infrastructure Regulatory Systems, 2006, Ashley C. Brown, Jon 
Stern, and Bernard Tenenbaum with Defne Gencer. the World Bank, Washington, D.C., p.5 
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position to conduct investigations necessary for evaluating previous decisions. All these 
features are important if the regulator is to deter corruption. Therefore, we expect that 
strong regulatory substance is associated with less facilitation payments in the sector. 
Our two measures of the regulatory system capture the actual operating procedures 
of regulatory agencies, distinguishing our research from previous empirical studies that 
focus solely on elements of regulatory governance. To our knowledge, this paper is the 
first one to quantify regulatory substance to test the effects of government regulation on 
perceived corporate corruption in the telecom sector.
6
 
Our analysis uses the World Bank datasets (WBES and EECAS) that contain 
enterprise-level data on bribes paid to telecom utilities and a unique cross-country 
telecom regulation dataset collected by Wallsten et al. (2004). Based on a sample of 
3,731 firms in 26 transitional economies, we find strong evidence that both regulatory 
substance and regulatory governance reduce corporate corruption. We find competition 
reduces corruption and along another industry feature, state-owned telecoms are 
associated with more corruption. Furthermore, the effects of regulatory substance on 
corruption reduction are more pronounced in countries with more competition, less 
privatization and higher telecom fees. Our results suggest that regulatory strategies that 
reduce information asymmetry and increase accountability tend to reduce corruption. 
Our study makes several contributions to the existing research.  First, there is 
substantial literature on corruption in the public utility sector;
7
 we extend previous studies 
                                                 
6 We use corporate corruption thereafter to refer to the particular form of corruption we examined in the paper, i.e., 
bribery and side-payments activities by private enterprises to telecom service providers; in some developing countries, 
telecommunications service is still owned or partially owned by the government, which we examine here. However, the 
main goal of this paper is to determine whether the regulator as the third party can effectively limit corruption between 
business customers and service providers.  For example, Kenny (2009) argues that a separate ―anticorruption agenda‖ 
in infrastructure reform may be misplaced: a broader agenda of improved governance simultaneously targets a wider 
range of issues (including transparency, professionalism, and citizen participation). 
7 For example, Clarke and Xu (2004) study how privatization and competition affect corruption in the telecom and 
electricity sector of developing countries. They find that increased competition, more expansive private ownership, and 
less stringent capacity constraints are associated with reduced corruption.  Bó and Rossi (2007) study 80 electricity 
firms from 13 Latin American countries and find that corruption in those countries is strongly associated with 
inefficiency within the industry. 
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by providing empirical evidence of how government regulation helps to curtail 
facilitation payments between customers and service providers during the process of 
regulatory reform.  This is an important point because the weak sector performance that 
results from this type of corporate corruption not only limits access to telephony and 
hinders utility reforms, but also constrains private business growth and development 
(Estache, Goicoechea, and Trujillo, 2009). Second, our study contributes to the literature 
on the micro-based incentive study on firm corrupt behavior in emerging countries 
(Svensson, 2003; Clarke and Xu, 2004; Cai, Fang and Xu, forthcoming). Third, we 
provide an quantitative study that complements the regulation literature examining the 
impacts of regulatory schemes on firm operations. Previous studies find that regulatory 
schemes affect service quality (e.g. Ai and Sappington, 2005), operating efficiency (e.g. 
Li and Xu, 2004; Berg, Lin and Tsaplin, 2005), and the provision of public goods (Bose, 
Capasso, and Murshid, 2008). We add to the existing literature by showing that 
regulatory schemes have significant effects on reducing the form of corruption that is 
associated with obtaining access to service.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents data 
and summary statistics. Section 3 presents empirical methodology and results. Section 4 
discusses robustness checks. Section 5 provides some concluding observations. 
 
2. Data 
Our data come from three main sources: (1) the World Business Environment 
Survey (WBES)
8
 in 1999-2000 and the Eastern Europe & Central Asia Survey (EECAS)  
in 2001 by the World Bank  for firm-level data on bribery frequencies, and a set of firm-
specific characteristics;
9
 (2) Wallsten et al. (2004) for country-level data on regulation 
                                                 
8 It is also called ―Measuring Conditions for Business Operation and Growth‖ Private Enterprise Questionnaire in 
1999. 
9 Note that we do not use the updated WBES survey data for 2005 published on the World Bank website because so 
far there has been only one cross-country regulation survey conducted among telecom regulators since 2001. This is 
about the same time as the WBES survey in 1999-2000. Also, since early 1990s, an increasing number of developing 
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from their survey conducted in 2001; and (3) World Telecommunication Regulatory 
Database published annually on the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
website for country-level data on privatization and competition, and the ITU Statistical 
Year Book 2002 for tariff-level data. We also collect macro country data from the IMF 
website, the World Bank website and country-level data on governance from the World 
Bank’s Worldwide Government Indicators (WGI) project by Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi (2006). While the combined WBES database and the EECAS data contain over 
80 countries, the Wallsten et al. (2004) regulation dataset includes data on only 45 
countries. The limited overlap of these three datasets reduces the sample to 3,731 firms 
from 26 countries.
10
  
In our sample, 35% of the firms are small firms (less than 10 employees), 10% are 
medium-sized (between 11 and 500 employees), and the remaining 55% are large firms 
(more than 500 employees). Most of the firms in the sample are from manufacturing 
(36%), service (45%), construction (10%), or agriculture (5%) sectors. To examine the 
relationship between regulation and bribery extracted from their business customers by 
managers of regulated firms (or their installation personnel), we employ firm-level data. 
We also control for a range of firm-specific and country-specific characteristics. 
2.1. Dependent Variable: Corruption 
The dependent variable, Corruption, is constructed based on the answers to the 
question ―Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to 
service providers to get connected to telephone?‖ in the WBES and EECAS surveys.11 
The answers to this question captures the frequency of bribery, including ―never‖, 
―seldom‖, ―sometimes‖, ―frequently‖, ―mostly‖ and ―always‖ in the survey.12 To reduce 
                                                                                                                                                 
countries started their regulatory reforms, which provides an ideal opportunity to identify variations in regulatory 
policies across countries. 
10 We exclude countries that have less than 10 firm observations. 
11 The EECAS survey is conducted by the World Bank, which uses essentially the same questionnaire, and contains 
more Eastern European and Central Asian firms. 
12 We dropped those firms that do not answer this question or respond ―I don’t know.‖  
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the possibility of idiosyncratic firm responses, we code the answers as ―1=never, 
2=seldom, sometimes, frequently, or mostly and 3=always.‖ 13  Overall, 62.2% of the 
firms report that firms in the sample report that they never make extra, unofficial 
payments to public officials to get connected to telephone, 5.2% of firms report that they 
always pay unofficial payments to the service providers, the rest of firms report they pay 
bribes with frequencies from seldom to mostly. The average frequencies of bribes for 
each country are shown in Table 1 (column 3). We compare the calculated aggregate 
frequencies of bribes with the Transparency International Global Corruption Perception 
Index (GCPI) in Figure 1. Since the GCPI ranges between 1 and 6, with higher value 
indicating less corruption and our frequencies of bribes are measured with higher value 
indicating more corruption, we find a negative correlation between these two indexes, 
suggesting that our measure of country level corruption is consistent with Transparency 
International. We calculate the overall standard deviation of the Corruption variable, 
which is 0.59, and the between-country standard deviation and within-country standard 
deviation, which are 0.32 and 0.50, respectively.
14
 Since the mean of Corruption is 1.43, 
the differences in standard deviations imply that the frequencies of bribes vary not only 
across countries but also across firms within countries.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
2.2. Explanatory Variables 
The main explanatory variables are measures of (1) regulation systems, including 
regulatory governance and regulatory substance; (2) whether the operators are state-
owned, partially state-owned, or fully privatized; (3) level of competition in local 
telephone service, and (4) the tariff level (including the installation fee and subscription 
                                                 
13  In our previous version of working paper, we have coded the answers as ―1 = never, 2 = seldom, 3 = sometimes, 
4 = frequently, 5 = mostly and 6 = always‖, and all the empirical results are consistent with the current ones. 
14 The between-country standard deviation is calculated from the country averages; the within country standard 
deviation is calculated using the deviations from country averages. 
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fee). Appendix Table 1 provides detailed definitions for all the variables used throughout 
the paper. Figure 2 below illustrates the theoretical links among the factors that could 
affect perceived bribery. The expected signs for these factors are discussed later.  First, 
we specify how to construct variables for these factors.  
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
2.2.1. Regulatory substance 
Drawing upon Levy and Spiller’s (1994, 1996) and Brown et al.’s (2006) work, we 
employ the ―World Bank Telecommunications Regulation Survey‖ by Wallsten et al. 
(2004) to construct four general indicators of regulatory substance: Tariff Setting, Quality 
of Service Standards, Accountants Ratio, and Periodic Review.  In general, an effective 
regulator must have the power to set tariffs, define quality of service standards, have 
effective accounting systems, and conduct periodic reviews of her decisions. 
The tariff setting process is important to protect infrastructure customers and gain 
the confidence of investors. The regulator should have the power to establish a reasonable 
tariff level for telecommunications services and have the capacity to monitor operator 
compliance.  Regulation of tariffs constrains the abuse of monopoly power by the service 
providers and reduces their power to require side payments. We use whether the prices 
are regulated as a proxy for the power of the regulator on tariff setting.
15
   
It is also important for regulators to set a minimum service standard that the utility 
providers are expected to meet (Brown et al. 2006).  If the regulator can determine 
detailed standards for the regulated companies, make both consumers and investors aware 
of the nature of the service, and if the prices are set at reasonable levels, service providers 
will be less able to exercise discretion towards their customers, and bribes should be less 
frequent. Therefore, as a proxy for quality of service standard we use information on 
                                                 
15 In unreported model specifications, we also added a variable for the tariff setting method. A more specific tariff 
setting method added to the indicator complicates the model; furthermore, the variable does not show a significant 
effect in the model and does not change the results. 
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whether key performance data (i.e., call completion rates by operator, faults and faults 
repair, and geographical coverage rates) are collected.
16
  
Audits can provide valuable information to regulators.  However, developing 
countries often lack reliable accounting and auditing systems (Laffont, 2005). This is 
often due to a limited number of accounting employees; therefore, to create a measure of 
a regulatory agency’s accounting resources, we scaled the number of accountants 
employed by the regulator by the annual revenues of the country’s telecommunications 
industry (in U.S. dollars). To avoid a downwards bias of this ratio for countries with large 
telecommunications sectors, a value of ―1‖ is given for the country with the maximum of 
this ratio, which is in Honduras (0.0869). For the other countries, the above calculated 
ratio is divided by 0.0869. This yields a proxy variable corresponding to the Accountants 
Ratio.  
Periodic regulatory review is a necessary procedure if the agency is to evaluate 
previous decisions and incorporate performance indicators into rate reviews. Performing 
such routine regulatory functions reduces regulatory discretion and puts a spotlight on 
managerial behavior.  It can also reduce undue discrimination toward consumers and 
limit abusive business practices (including bribery requests). We use the answer to the 
question ―whether there is a set period of time between regulatory reviews‖ as a 
measurement for Periodic Review. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The correlation matrices for elements of this index are presented in Table 2. As the 
regulatory indicators are usually highly correlated, including them all together in the 
regression would introduce severe multicollinearity. To avoid this, we calculate an 
aggregate measure of regulatory substance by taking the average of these four 
                                                 
16   We acknowledge that the available data are imperfect measurements for determining whether a national 
regulator sets detailed service standards, but due to data limitations, those are the best proxies available. In developing 
countries, data collection has not been conducted in a systematic way. Therefore, the presence of such indicators serves 
as a good indicator for whether there is standardized required service performance in those countries, which is unlikely 
if the regulator does not bother (or is unable) to collect performance data.     
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indicators.
17
 This aggregate regulatory substance variable ranges between 0.0100 and 
0.9000 in the sample, with a mean of 0.4952 and a standard deviation of 0.2175. Higher 
values mean tighter regulatory substance policy. The summary statistics for regulatory 
substance and other key variables are presented in Table 3. The country-level relationship 
between the regulatory substance index and the bribe frequencies is plotted in Figure 3. 
The pattern clearly shows that frequencies of bribes are lower in countries with stricter 
regulatory substance. We discuss the empirical analysis results in detail in Section 3. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
2.2.2. Regulatory governance 
We incorporate regulatory governance into the analysis by utilizing four elements: 
Independence of the Regulator, Clarity of Responsibility, Accountability, and 
Transparency and Participation. According to Stern (1994), Stern and Holder (1999) and 
Gutièrrez (2003), telecommunications regulation is far more credible in countries where 
regulatory governance is characterized by these four elements.  
We follow the above literature to construct each regulatory governance variable by 
applying the same weight to each survey question.
18
 After constructing four indicators to 
measure regulatory governance, we also define an overall index for regulatory 
governance by taking the average of the four individual indicators. Again, as some of the 
regulatory governance indicators are highly correlated, to avoid multicollinearity 
problems, we use the overall index in the regression. The regulatory governance index 
ranges between 0.4063 and 0.9063 with a mean of 0.7492 and a standard deviation of 
0.1305.  As with the regulatory substance index, higher values of the regulatory 
governance index mean more comprehensive regulatory governance policy. 
                                                 
17 We have also used the principal component method to construct an alternative regulatory substance index. This 
method does not change our main results. However, for simplicity of interpreting the regression results, we utilized the 
equal weighting method to construct the regulatory substance index.  
18 Weighting the questions differently using the principal component method does not change the regression results 
significantly. 
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Compared with the regulatory substance index, the regulatory governance index is 
higher by about 20 percentage points on average. The difference in absolute value is 
largely caused by the small average value for the Accountants Ratio. To make the 
marginal effects comparable, section 3 will compare marginal effects based on a one 
standard deviation change rather than the marginal effects based on actual level changes. 
2.3. Tariff Level, State Ownership and Competition 
Several other country-level variables are also included. First, we include a Fee 
variable as a control variable to measure tariff level, which is calculated by the sum of the 
monthly subscription fee and installation fee scaled by the monthly GDP per capita.
19
 The 
range of the Fee variable in our sample is quite large, from 0.0001 to 1.7771. Tariffs are a 
critical element of telecommunications service providers; they provide price signals to 
consumers, determine access to service, affect the financial sustainability of firms, and 
reflect the extent to which competitive pressures or regulatory requirements limit above-
normal profits.  However, the price of services is difficult to evaluate in the context of 
corruption. We expect that tariff level is positively associated with frequencies of bribery 
for the following reasons: First, the high tariff level could be due to high service costs, 
which leads to low rents for telecommunications service providers. In this case, the 
service providers are more likely to seek extra payments to defray their high costs (or to 
allow installation staff to extract rents). Furthermore, if the installation fee is very high 
but the service quality is poor, the combination might cause users to make extra payments 
to the telecom provider to repair their telephone systems: users have already paid 
installation fees, and the incremental bribery payments are low relative to incremental 
benefits. Second, it is also possible that the high price of telecom service is associated 
with high rents to the service provider. By 2004 (when the survey was taken) telephone 
                                                 
19 The importance of the installation is emphasized here, since the up-front fee could be introduced as an annualized 
value.  The results are unaffected if we replace the Fee variable with either the monthly subscription fee or the 
installation fee in the regressions. 
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service was still limited in many developing countries, due to technological limitations 
(line-line rather than mobile phones) or affordability issues. In those areas, telephone 
service consumption is like a luxury good – enabling service providers to request side 
payments for trivial services, even when those services may be costless (such as 
connecting multiple phones on one line).  
We also include telecoms’ ownership and competition in our analysis since, as 
Gasmi and Virto (2010) note, infrastructure reform policies often involve the bundling of 
complementary initiatives. The variable Competition is measured by the logarithm of the 
number of operators within a country in 2001. The number of operators ranges from 1 to 
5 in our sample. The variable for telecoms’ ownership is measured with three dummy 
variables:  state-owned, partially state-owned, or fully privatized. Martimont and Straub 
(2009) find that in Latin America, privatization seemed to foster greater corruption, 
which (they argued) could explain the lack of popularity of infrastructure reforms in the 
region. However, in some developing countries, telecoms are still state-owned or involve 
partial government ownership. Using a broader database (and different indicators of 
corruption), the current study provides another test of the impact of telecoms’ ownership 
on corruption.    
2.4. Other Firm-specific Characteristics and Country-level Control Variables 
Firm-specific control variables, which are derived from the WBES/EECAS survey 
questions, include firm ownership, firm size, sector, etc.  We expect a firm’s ownership 
to affect utility bribe payments, though there are some counteracting forces: private firms 
tend to have less political influence than government-owned firms, so they might be less 
able to resist bribe demands (Clarke and Xu, 2004); on the other hand, small business 
firms are likely to suffer from cash flow problems, which reduce their ability to pay 
bribes (Clarke and Xu, 2004); firms from different sectors have different valuations of 
(and demands for) telecom service and thus may exhibit different frequencies of paying 
bribery, holding everything else constant. We also include exporter as a dummy variable: 
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this takes on the value of one if the firm exports, and zero otherwise.  An export-oriented 
firm will place a particularly high value on telecommunications services.  
In addition, we control for many country-specific attributes, including the 
Logarithm of GDP Per Capita, the logarithm of Population, GDP Growth, and Inflation 
level, and Urban Share (Urban population as a percentage of total population) as they 
may reflect the potential gain to business customers from having a working phone 
system. Willingness to pay for service translates into a willingness to pay bribes. 
 
3. Estimation 
3.1 Baseline Regression 
Due to the discrete nature of the dependent variable, we mainly use an ordered 
probit model in our regression analysis. We also compute heteroskedastic robust standard 
errors clustered at the country level to allow the errors to be correlated within countries. 
We first report results for regressions that include regulatory substance index (columns 1-
2 of Table 4-A) and regulatory governance index (column 3 of Table 4-A), respectively. 
We then include both of the indexes together (column 4 of Table 4-A). Finally, we 
aggregate these into one regulation index, constructed by taking the average of the 
regulatory governance and substance index. For all these regressions, we control for firm 
size and industry dummy variables. 
[Insert Table 4-A about here] 
In order to demonstrate the magnitude of the effectiveness of regulatory policies on 
corruption control, we further compute the marginal effects of regulation on the 
probabilities that firms choose each of the three corruption levels (from ―never‖ to 
―always‖). For this, we use the coefficient estimates from the model that includes both 
regulation indexes, i.e. regression (4) in Table 4-A.  
Table 4-B presents the marginal effects for an ―average‖ enterprise. As we noted 
earlier, to make the marginal effects comparable, we compare marginal effects based on a 
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one standard deviation change rather than the marginal effects based on actual level 
changes. We also report impacts if the variable changes from the minimum value to the 
maximum value. As can be seen, the magnitudes of the economic impacts are quite large. 
For instance, the estimated results suggest that a one standard deviation increase in the 
regulatory substance index would lead to a 17.54 percentage point decrease in the 
probability that a firm reports that it needs to pay the additional unofficial payments with 
frequencies ranges between never and always. If the regulatory substance index increases 
from the minimum to maximum in the sample, the probability that a firm reports such 
payment decreases by 43.74 percentage points. The effects are substantial, since about 
33% of the firms in the sample report that they need to pay side payments in the middle 
range of frequencies (between never and always), while about 60% of the firms say they 
do not need to bribe the telecom service providers.  
Similarly, the estimates imply that a one standard deviation increase in the 
regulatory governance index value would lead to a 8.51 percentage point decrease in the 
probability that a firm reports it needs to pay the additional unofficial payments from 
seldom to mostly. If the regulatory governance index increases from the minimum to 
maximum in the sample, the probability that a firm reports such payment decreases by 
29.95 percentage points.  
 [Insert Table 4-B about here] 
The results show that overall, regulatory substance has a strong effect in controlling 
for corruption: an impact often ignored in earlier research.
20
 It is not intuitively obvious 
why regulation has a greater impact on corruption control when bribery happens in the 
middle range of frequencies rather than always. One reason could be that the benefits for 
those firms that need to pay side payments are marginal. If the regulatory intervention is 
                                                 
20  We think to draw a conclusion of the magnitude of the effects for regulatory governance and substance on 
corruption control needs to be cautious, but our empirical results clearly show that at least regulatory substance is an 
important factor to deter corporate corruption which is often ignore in the past empirical analysis.   
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effective in controlling bribery, top executives of firms supplying telecommunications 
services will be more likely to develop mitigation programs that reduce extortion and 
bribes: the risk of penalties from bribery might outweigh the benefits service providers 
can obtain.
21
  If these benefits accrue to installers or other labors, then higher level 
managers might be engaging in more active prevention programs in those situations—
having an impact on the margin.   
Tables 4-A and 4-B also present other important findings. First, the regression 
results often predict reduced bribery in the presence of privatization and competition. 
This is consistent with Clarke and Xu’s (2004) findings. Second, the tariff level (Fee) 
enters positive and statistically significant in all regressions. This result supports our 
previous conjecture that high tariff levels tend to be associated with more bribery. Third, 
the firm and country control variables yield some interesting results, too. In all 
specifications, government-owned firms purchasing telecommunications services are less 
likely to pay bribes than their privately owned counterparts. Other things equal, 
government-owned firms are more likely to say that they never need to do so. This 
finding suggests that in developing countries, private firms are much more vulnerable to 
unofficial payment requests than government-owned firms. It seems that state-owned 
customers have ―protection‖ stemming from their connections to powerful ministries.  
This result also suggests that justice is not practiced in an even-handed fashion in 
developing and transition economies.  In addition, the coefficients on the GDP growth 
are positive and statistically significant in most of the models for the frequency of 
bribery, suggesting that firms in countries with higher GDP growth reported more 
exposure to bribery, due to the fact that telecom service in those countries may be more 
valuable than in other countries. 
                                                 
21 One might ask, ―Who benefits from a bribe?‖ The answer is both parties—otherwise the transaction would not 
occur.  Of course, the customer would be even better off if there were no bribe. Furthermore, the legitimacy of the 
governance system is increased when bribery is infrequent. 
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In summary, the preliminary results indicate that a regulatory environment 
featuring strong regulatory governance and substance reduces corporate corruption in the 
telecom sector. The effect of regulation on corruption control is not only statistically 
significant, but also economically relevant; furthermore, the econometric model fits the 
data well. In terms of the fit, the Pseudo R
2
 stays over 10%, which is high for these types 
of cross-firm empirical studies (Beck et al., 2006).   
Tables 4-A and 4-B present the main regression results. Although we use non-
linear model here, a linear model yields similar quantitative results. Appendix Table 2 
replicates the regression in Table 4-A using the ordinary least square (OLS) model. 
3.2. Different Categorizations For Corruption 
To reduce the possibility that idiosyncratic firm responses will bias our results 
since the answers across each category are unbalanced (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 
2006), we use the dummy variable to represent corruption (―0‖ if ―never‖ is being 
answered on perceived corruption and ―1‖ if otherwise) and probit model to repeat the 
entire analysis. The probit regression results are presented in Table 5 (column 1-2).
22
 We 
also present our results for using six categories of corruption and ordered probit model in 
column 3-4 of Table 5. For all these regressions, we control for firm size and industry 
dummies. The impacts of regulatory substance and regulatory governance remain 
negative and statistically significant after we use different categorizations for corruption, 
suggesting that our main results are robust to different categorizations of bribe 
frequencies. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
                                                 
22  To further alleviate this concern, we use probit models to repeat all the ordered probit analysis in the paper, we 
do not find any inconsistent results. Following Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2006), we also omitted each country 
one-at-a-time and we do not find that firm responses from a single country drive the results. These results are not 
reported due to space limitations; they are available from the authors upon request.  
 18 
3.3. Controlling for Other Macro Country-Level Variables 
A large body of research has examined the effects of country-level variables on 
corruption. Even though most of these variables are not expected to affect corporate 
corruption in the utility sector, they may affect overall country level corruption, which 
could indirectly affect the utility corruption (Clarke and Xu, 2004). To the extent that 
some of the unobservable elements can be correlated with country-level variables, 
excluding them could cause omitted variable bias. To check this, we utilize data from the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project related to political rights and 
democracy; in addition, we also added government spending and the ratio of fuel, ore and 
metal exports to GDP, respectively, to the base regression, i.e., regression (4) of Table 4-
A (which contains detailed definitions). The results for coefficient estimation are 
presented in Table 6. The coefficients on these control variables are all statistically 
significant. The main results for regulatory substance and regulatory governance remain 
negative and statistically significant even after the inclusion of these variables. Overall, 
firms have less frequency to pay bribes in countries with better political rights, more 
natural resource exports, a higher democracy level, and greater government expenditures.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
3.4. Controlling for Institutional Environment  
Another source of omitted variable bias might come from characteristics of the 
institutional environment. As pointed out by Beck et al. (2006), countries with different 
general institutional environment may choose different regulatory practices. At the same 
time, these different institutional traits may affect the integrity of regulation in the 
telecommunications industry. Following Beck et al. (2006), we examine whether 
omitting institutional environment variables can cause a serious bias in our estimates.  
To control for the country’s institutional environment, we further include a series of 
political and institutional quality indices – the World Governance Indices (WGI). The 
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WGI (Kaufmann et al., 2006) are constructed with six indicators, based on 276 individual 
variables from 31 sources, produced by 25 different organizations. In particular, these 
indicators measure six different dimensions of governance: (1) Voice and Accountability, 
which measures public participation and media freedom; (2) Political Stability and 
Absence of Violence, which measures legal protection; (3) Government Effectiveness, 
which measures bureaucratic quality; (4) Regulatory Quality, which measures policy 
implementation ability; (5) Rule of Law, which measures law enforcement and legal 
system efficiency; and (6) Control of Corruption, which measures the extent to which 
public power can resist corruption.
23
 The results for coefficient estimation are presented 
in Table 7. Again, the coefficients are consistent with our previous results: both 
regulatory governance and regulator substance have negative signs in all regressions, and 
almost all of them are statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, all the estimated 
coefficients of WGI variables are negative and statistically significant, suggesting that a 
better general institutional environment lowers the degree to which firms have to bribe 
the telecom sector to obtain service.  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
3.5. Endogeneity and Instrumental Variable (IV) Estimation 
Although our results so far have just shown a correlation between corruption and 
regulation, the causal effect is more likely to run from better regulation to less corruption 
since it is hard to argue that an individual firm’s views about corruption will influence a 
country’s telecom regulatory policies. Nonetheless, there may still be a feedback effect 
running from the private sector to the regulatory authorities: a high level of corporate 
corruption may lead to pressure for more effective regulation (Beck et al. 2006). We use 
instrumental variable estimation to address this endogeneity concern.  
In particular, we use the absolute value of a country’s latitude, financial depth, 
                                                 
23 Appendix Table 1 defines these variables in detail. 
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ideologies of voters, checks and balances in the governance, and ideological polarization 
as instrumental variables (IVs). We chose the absolute value of a country’s latitude as our 
instrumental variable based on the recent research building on endowment theory, which 
focuses on the roles of geography, culture, and the disease environment in shaping 
institutional development (Easterly and Levine, 1997; Beck et al., 2003). The variable has 
also been used in recent corruption studies as instrumental variables of regulation and 
institutions (e.g. Beck et al., 2006; Houston et al., 2011). The basic idea of including the 
absolute value of a country’s latitude as an instrumental variable is that European 
colonization shapes the country institutions and policy systems, Beck et al. (2006) have 
argued that European tendency to extracting natural resources generates more powerful 
administrative structures. Since Europeans usually do not settle in tropical climates, more 
temperate climates are usually associated with more European settlers and more 
egalitarian policies. 
Based on the work by Li and Xu (2002), who study the determinants of 
telecommunications sector reforms, we use as our other instrumental variables some of 
the special determinants that affect telecommunications regulation but otherwise do not 
affect corruption perception for non-telecommunications companies. These include 
financial depth, ideologies of voters, checks and balances in the government, and 
ideological polarization. The variables have been shown to be important determinants of 
privatization and competition in the telecommunications sector. The detailed definitions 
are shown in Appendix Table 1. We argue that it is also reasonable to use them to 
instrument the regulation index because privatization, competition and regulation are 
inter-related policies in regulatory reforms. Based on Li and Xu’s (2002) argument, the 
ideas for using these variables as IVs are: (1) Businesses that rely heavily on the 
telecommunications services are the main beneficiaries of regulatory policy reforms. 
Among businesses, the financial service sector is one of the largest users of such services. 
Therefore, countries with relatively large financial sectors are more likely to implement 
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reforms in the telecommunications sector; (2) Ideologies of voters and politicians can 
help explain regulatory changes (Kalt and Zupan, 1984). In particular, parties with 
different ideologies may prefer divergent policies; for example, right-wing parties are 
more likely to make regulatory reforms (though crony capitalism can limit these reforms); 
and (3) Countries with more checks and balances can have some veto players who are in 
a position to block regulatory reforms more effectively. 
Before we show our two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation results, it is worth 
noting that, given the different context of our paper, the IVs we borrow may not totally 
eliminate the endogeneity bias here. It is plausible that some of the IVs may affect 
corruption directly rather than through regulation. For example, different ideological 
inclinations are more likely in democratic countries, and democracy is also considered as 
a determinant of corruption. Without good ideas of to what extent such direct correlations 
may contaminate the 2SLS estimates, we tend to interpret our 2SLS results as merely a 
sensitivity test rather than the true causal effects of regulation on corruption. 
Table 8 reports results from 2SLS estimation based on specification as in 
regression (4) of Table 4-A. The F-statistics in the first stage indicate that the coefficients 
on the instruments are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The over-
identifying restrictions are not rejected at any significance level (1%, 5% or 10%) for all 
specifications. The R-square in the first stage estimation is above 95%, suggesting a good 
model of fit. After the instrumentation, the key explanatory variables – regulatory 
governance and substance – and other explanatory variables all retain the same signs. 
There are no significant changes from the 2SLS estimation, suggesting that our main 
analysis does not suffer from serious endogeneity bias. 
 [Insert Table 8 about here] 
4. Nonlinear Effects – Interaction Analysis 
In Table 9, we include interaction terms to test whether the effects of regulatory 
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substance vary by other country-level variables.
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 More specifically, in regression (1) – (6) 
of Table 9, we add the interaction between regulatory substance and state-owned dummy 
variable (column 1), interaction between regulatory substance and partially state-owned 
dummy variable (column 2), both regulatory substance and the state ownership 
interaction terms (column 3), interaction between regulatory substance and competition 
(column 4), interaction between regulatory substance and the tariff level 
(Regulation*High Fee)
25
(column 5), and interaction between regulatory substance and 
government effectiveness (column 6).  
We find that (1) the effects of regulatory substance on corruption are more 
significant in countries with state-owned or partially state-owned telecoms; (2) the effects 
of regulatory substance on corruption control are more pronounced within competitive 
telecommunications markets; (3) an extremely low price for telecom service may provide 
substantial financial leeway for firms to pay extra money (via bribery) even in the 
absence of effective regulatory substance; and (4) the country’s government effectiveness 
serves as a substitute for regulatory substance as a deterrence to corporate corruption. 
These findings are important as they suggest that the government and private sector 
should work together to create a more efficient regulatory framework, a competitive 
market with reasonable prices, in order to reduce telecom sector facilitation payment 
issues that hinders firm operations and artificially limits growth potential. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
 
                                                 
24 We searched the literature and to our best knowledge, the econometric estimators for calculating the marginal 
effects of interaction terms in the full value range of covariates have not been developed for ordered probit models. 
Although we use non-linear model here, a linear model would yield similar quantitative results as we show in 
Appendix Table 2 that the results for both models without interactions are very similar for our sample. Given the 
concern of interpreting the results for interaction terms in non-linear models, we confirm all our findings with OLS 
regressions and we find that the interaction effects using ordered probit model are consistent with those using OLS 
model. These results are not reported in the paper but available from the author upon request. 
25 We define High Fee =1 if the tariff level is above the medium of the overall sample, and 0, otherwise. 
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5. Conclusions  
Using the World Bank datasets (WBES and EECAS) covering enterprise-level data 
on bribes paid to telecom utilities, and a unique cross country telecom regulation dataset 
collected by Wallsten et al. (2004), this paper examines how government regulation 
affects corporate corruption in the telecom sector. We find strong evidence that both 
regulatory substance and regulatory governance reduce corruption. In addition, we find 
that competition has positive effects on corruption control but state-owned telecoms have 
negative effects on corruption reduction; the effects of regulatory substance on corruption 
control are stronger in countries with more competition, state-owned or partially state-
owned telecoms and higher telecom fees; finally, government effectiveness exert 
substitution effects to regulatory substance in deterring corruption. 
Many empirical studies do not incorporate regulatory substance effects due to the 
difficulty of obtaining comparable data on policies. This study provides a starting point 
for evaluating the regulatory substance effects on corruption. The research both 
constructs and utilizes an index based on information on tariff setting, accountants’ ratio, 
quality of service standards, and periodic reviews. Future research could enhance this 
index by incorporating more comprehensive indicators of the accounting system. 
Furthermore, an evaluation of how each component of a regulatory system affects sector 
outcomes would also be interesting.  
If new national regulatory systems cannot promote good outcomes within 
infrastructure sectors, the agencies will lose political legitimacy and investor credibility; 
their efficacy will be called into question.   Therefore, the ultimate goal for policymakers 
is not a specific set of institutional features, but a sustainable system which can convince 
investors (both equity owners and bond-holders) that service providers have the 
opportunity to earn profits on investments (commensurate with risks) and also assure 
consumers that the industry is providing service improvements at affordable prices. 
Processes that increase transparency and citizen participation are more likely to address 
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perceived problems (like bribery) than regulatory agencies which lack professionalism or 
are not interested in promoting citizens’ confidence in the entire governance system. 
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Figure 1. Relationship between Frequencies of Corruption and Transparency 
International Global Corruption Perception Index 
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Note: WBES Frequencies of Corruption is coded between 1 and 3, with 1= Never, 2=Seldom, Sometimes, Frequently, or Mostly, 
3=Always, based on answers to the question ―Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service 
providers to get connected to telephone?‖ The Transparency International Global Corruption Perception Index ranges between 1 and 
6, with higher value indicating less corruption. The negative correlation between WBES Frequencies of Corruption and Transparency 
International indicates the consistency of measurement for country corruption.                                                                   
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Figure 2. Factors Affecting Perceived Bribery 
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Figure 3. Relationship between Frequencies of Corruption and Regulatory Substance 
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Note: WBES Frequencies of Corruption is coded between 1 and 3, with 1= Never, 2=Seldom, Sometimes, Frequently, or 
Mostly, 3=Always, based on answers to the question ―Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments 
to service providers to get connected to telephone?‖ 
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Table 1. Country List, Corruption Indexes and Regulation Indexes 
Country Region 
WBES 
Corruption 
Transparency 
International 
Regulatory 
Substance 
Regulatory 
Governance 
Bulgaria Europe 1.36 4 0.43 0.80 
Colombia South America 2.27 3.6 0.05 - 
Costa Rica Central America 2.36 4.5 0.01 - 
Czech Republic Europe 1.22 3.7 0.70 0.74 
Dominican Republic Central America 2.25 3.5 0.07 - 
Ecuador South America 2.31 2.2 0.08 - 
Estonia Europe 1.07 5.6 0.81 - 
Ghana Africa 1.79 3.9 0.75 0.82 
Guatemala Central America 2.55 2.5 0.21 - 
Honduras North America 2.45 2.7 0.90 - 
Hungary Europe 1.16 4.9 0.51 0.41 
India Asia 2.03 2.7 0.65 0.65 
Kenya Africa 1.79 1.9 0.73 0.75 
Malawi Africa 1.93 2.9 0.59 0.77 
Malaysia Asia 2.25 4.9 0.50 - 
Mexico North America 2.75 3.6 0.51 0.69 
Moldova Europe 1.41 2.1 0.44 0.75 
Namibia Africa 1.03 5.7 0.40 0.62 
Pakistan Asia 2.33 2.6 0.57 0.79 
Poland Europe 1.28 4.0 0.42 - 
Romania Europe 1.64 2.6 0.42 - 
Slovak Republic Europe 1.25 3.7 0.73 0.63 
South Africa Africa 1.40 4.8 0.60 0.53 
Tanzania Africa 1.68 2.7 0.74 0.84 
Turkey Europe 1.37 3.2 0.20 0.91 
Uganda Africa 1.88 2.1 0.25 - 
Notes: This table presents the list of countries studied in the paper. The WBES corruption index represents the average of 
firm’s frequencies of bribery by each country calculated from the answers to the WBES survey question ―Do firms like 
yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service providers to get connected to telephone?‖ with 1= 
Never, 2=Seldom, Sometimes, Frequently, or Mostly, and 3=Always.  The Transparency International index is directly 
derived from the Transparency International Global Corruption Perception Index (CPI) of in year 2002.  The definition and 
calculation of Regulatory Governance and Regulatory Substance indexes can be found in Appendix Table 1. 
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Table 2. Correlation Matrix for Elements of Regulatory Substance and Regulatory Governance Indexes 
 
Independence Clarity of Roles Accountability 
Transparency and 
Participation 
Accountants 
Ratio Tariff Setting 
Quality of Service 
Standards 
Clarity of Roles 0.4840* 
      
Accountability 0.4481* 0.0837* 
     
Transparency and 
Participation 
-0.6104* -0.1753* -0.5364* 
    
Accountants Ratio -0.2880* 0.1187* -0.2495* 0.2068* 
   
Tariff Setting -0.4396* -0.3220* -0.1342* 0.3809* 0.4702* 
  
Quality of Service 
Standards 
-0.3460* 0.0755* -0.0494* 0.1116* 0.4683* 0.5860* 
 
Periodic Review -0.5208* -0.3917* -0.4599* 0.3413* 0.4525* 0.5716* 0.1496* 
Note: * represents significance at 5% level 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
corruption 1.4304 0.5919 1 3 
regulatory substance 0.4952  0.2175  0.0100 0.9000 
regulatory governance 0.7492  0.1305  0.4063  0.9063  
state_owned 0.0809 0.2728 0 1 
partially_state_owned 0.1723 0.3777 0 1 
fully privatized 0.8329 0.3100 0 1 
competition (# of competitors) 1.5871  0.8572  1 51.6094  
fee 0.1801  0.3458  0.0001  1.7771  
smallest 0.3526  0.4778  0 1 
small 0.0376  0.19.04  0 1 
medium 0.0165  0.1275  0 1 
large 0.0224  0.1480  0 1 
largest 0.0181  0.1332  0 1 
government 0.1176  0.3054  0 1 
foreign 0.1070  0.2756  0 1 
manufacturing 0.3629  0.4809  0 1 
service 0.4481  0.4974  0 1 
agriculture 0.0510  0.2200  0 1 
construction 0.0944  0.2924  0 1 
export 0.4134  0.4925  0 1 
GDP per capita (000s of US$) 7.5314  0.9292  5.0609  8.7680  
GDP growth -2.3637  6.9923  -32.4600  11.6200  
inflation 17.4894  19.0840  -0.2000  64.9000  
population (in 1,000,000) 61.7000  19.1000  0.2498  1,020  
urban share 56.2142  14.6669  12.1000  90.1000  
Note: This table shows summary statistics for all the variables used in the main regression. Definitions for all the 
variables are presented in Appendix Table 1. 
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Table 4-A. Ordered Probit Regression: Determinants of Corporate Corruption  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
regulatory substance -1.2995*** -1.8496*** 
 
-2.8162** 
 
 (0.3532) (0.5041) 
 
(1.3607) 
 regulatory governance 
  
-2.0875*** -1.9690*** 
 
   
(0.5366) (0.4550) 
 regulation 
    
-4.4227*** 
     
(0.9860) 
fee 0.5293*** 0.2244 0.2590*** 0.6082*** 0.5336*** 
 
(0.0791) (0.1420) (0.0990) (0.2193) (0.1303) 
competition -0.2219 -0.6548*** -0.7971*** -1.4128*** -1.3006*** 
 
(0.1551) (0.2443) (0.1182) (0.3733) (0.2280) 
state_owned 0.7770*** 0.4582*** 0.8025*** 0.8421*** 0.8561*** 
 (0.1560) (0.1574) (0.2187) (0.2099) (0.2174) 
partially_state_owned 0.4799** 0.5460** -0.1381 0.1340 0.0548 
 (0.1896) (0.2218) (0.1633) (0.2162) (0.1285) 
government -0.8895*** -0.9047*** -0.8361*** -0.8288*** -0.8303*** 
 
(0.1096) (0.1113) (0.1250) (0.1227) (0.1234) 
foreign -0.2067** -0.2054** -0.1042 -0.0760 -0.0822 
 
(0.0969) (0.1016) (0.1113) (0.1127) (0.1118) 
export -0.1111* -0.0976 -0.0753 -0.0581 -0.0631 
 
(0.0619) (0.0617) (0.0681) (0.0706) (0.0689) 
GDP per capita 
 
-0.3005** -0.6498*** -0.2887 -0.3899*** 
 
 
(0.1172) (0.0984) (0.1766) (0.0641) 
GDP growth 
 
0.0008 0.0237*** 0.0337*** 0.0323*** 
  
(0.0107) (0.0050) (0.0082) (0.0068) 
inflation 
 
0.0012 0.0172*** 0.0126*** 0.0146*** 
  
(0.0048) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0046) 
population 
 
0.2163** 0.4154*** 0.5732*** 0.5423*** 
 
 
(0.1098) (0.0732) (0.1216) (0.0866) 
urban share 
 
-0.0052 0.0212*** -0.0106 -0.0023 
  
(0.0091) (0.0075) (0.0138) (0.0043) 
      Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Size Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      N 3731 3731 2786 2786 2786 
pseudo R-sq 0.1160 0.1476 0.1376 0.1396 0.1395 
Note: The regressions are run based on ordered probit model, which is based on standard maximum likelihood 
estimation. The dependent variable "Corruption" is based on answers to the question - Do firms like yours typically 
need to make extra, unofficial payments to service providers to get connected to telephone? (1 = never, 2 = seldom, 
sometimes, frequently, mostly and 3 = always). Regressions include six dummies for firm size based upon employment 
and five dummies based upon sector of operations - manufacturing; agriculture, construction, service, and other. All the 
other variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are Huber-White 
standard errors allowing firms' error terms within country to be correlated for regressions. i.e., clustered errors at the 
country level. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.  
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Table 4-B. Marginal Effects on Bribery for an ―Average‖ Enterprise 
    
 
               Seldom ~ Mostly               Always         
regulatory substance one standard dev. increase -0.1754** -0.0272**  
 
change from min to max -0.4374** -0.0971**  
regulatory governance one standard dev. increase -0.0851*** -0.0126***  
 
change from min to max -0.2995*** -0.0746***  
fee one standard dev. increase 0.0632*** 0.0093***  
 
change from min to max 0.2634*** 0.0990***  
state_owned change from 0 to 1 0.2398*** 0.0861***  
partially_state_owned change from 0 to 1 0.0443 0.0070  
competition one standard dev. increase -0.1941*** -0.0305***  
 
change from min to max -0.5102*** -0.0701***  
government one standard dev. increase -0.0878*** -0.0130***  
 
change from min to max -0.2439*** -0.0230***  
foreign one standard dev. increase -0.0070 -0.0010  
 
change from min to max -0.0250 -0.0035  
export change from 0 to 1 -0.0192 -0.0028  
GDP per capita one standard dev. increase -0.0903 -0.0134  
 
change from min to max -0.3248 -0.0765  
GDP growth one standard dev. increase 0.0756*** 0.0112***  
 
change from min to max 0.4090*** 0.0543***  
inflation one standard dev. increase 0.0821*** 0.0122***  
 
change from min to max 0.2468*** 0.0575***  
population one standard dev. increase 0.2676*** 0.0448***  
 
change from min to max 0.3330*** 0.5935***  
urban share one standard dev. increase -0.0525 -0.0077  
  change from min to max -0.2024 -0.0394  
Note: This table shows marginal effects on bribery for an ―average‖ enterprise with explanatory variable one standard deviation 
increase or change from min to max. The regression is run based on ordered probit model as of regression (4) of Table 5-A. All 
the variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; ***  significant  at 1% level. 
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Table 5. Determinants of Corporate Corruption: Different Categorizations  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Categories Two Two Six Six 
Model Probit Probit Ordered Probit Ordered Probit 
regulatory substance -1.7404** 
 
-3.7793*** 
 
 
(0.8831) 
 
(1.2930) 
 
regulatory governance -1.8261*** 
 
-1.6683*** 
 
 
(0.4438) 
 
(0.4288) 
 
regulation 
 
-3.6114*** 
 
-4.5753*** 
  
(0.7878) 
 
(0.9339) 
fee 0.5517*** 0.5602*** 0.7983*** 0.6124*** 
 
(0.1088) (0.1592) (0.2137) (0.1149) 
competition -1.1956*** -1.2084*** -1.5785*** -1.3020*** 
 
(0.2184) (0.1738) (0.3593) (0.2226) 
state_owned 0.7015** 0.7009** 0.8064*** 0.8412*** 
 
(0.2787) (0.2750) (0.2130) (0.2240) 
partially_state_owned 0.0232 0.0312 0.1569 -0.0412 
 
(0.1991) (0.1241) (0.2118) (0.1282) 
government -0.7988*** -0.7987*** -0.7950*** -0.7989*** 
 
(0.1262) (0.1256) (0.1344) (0.1359) 
foreign -0.1128 -0.1123 -0.0702 -0.0867 
 
(0.0754) (0.0747) (0.1113) (0.1106) 
export -0.0579 -0.0575 -0.0623 -0.0751 
 
(0.0517) (0.0546) (0.0642) (0.0623) 
GDP per capita -0.3836*** -0.3732*** -0.1265 -0.3781*** 
 
(0.1107) (0.0636) (0.1649) (0.0612) 
GDP growth 0.0335*** 0.0336*** 0.0361*** 0.0325*** 
 
(0.0078) (0.0082) (0.0079) (0.0063) 
inflation 0.0146*** 0.0144*** 0.0069 0.0119** 
 
(0.0050) (0.0054) (0.0043) (0.0047) 
population 0.5371*** 0.5408*** 0.6200*** 0.5443*** 
 
(0.1109) (0.0700) (0.1148) (0.0846) 
urban share -0.0061 -0.0069** -0.0235* -0.0030 
 
(0.0118) (0.0035) (0.0129) (0.0040) 
     
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Size Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 2786 2786 2786 2786 
pseudo R-sq 0.1558 0.1558 0.1084 0.1078 
Note: Regression (1)-(2) are run based on probit model, with dependent variable equals to zero if the answer 
is ―never‖ to the question - Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service 
providers to get connected to telephone?, and one if otherwise. Regression (3)-(4) are run based on ordered 
probit model, which is based on standard maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable 
"Corruption" is based on answers to the above question with 1 = never, 2 = seldom, 3 = sometimes, 4 = 
frequently, 5 = mostly and 6 = always. All regressions include six dummies for firm size based upon 
employment and five dummies based upon sector of operations - manufacturing; agriculture, construction, 
service, and other. All the other variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. Standard errors are Huber-White 
standard errors allowing firms' error terms within country to be correlated for regressions. i.e., clustered errors 
at the country level. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 6. Ordered Probit Regression with More Macro Country-Level Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
regulatory substance -3.3226** -2.4971*** -3.8700*** -2.4917** 
 (1.5227) (0.9328) (0.9864) (1.1766) 
regulatory governance -6.1278** -3.5069*** -2.9975*** -1.0599** 
 
(2.4337) (0.5802) (0.5504) (0.5266) 
political right -0.6944** 
   
 
(0.3270) 
   fuel_ore_metal 
 
-0.0821** 
  
  
(0.0377) 
  democracy 
  
-0.8789*** 
 
   
(0.1940) 
 government expenditure 
   
-1.9740*** 
    
(0.5816) 
fee 0.4872** 0.8130*** 0.0322 -0.0149 
 
(0.2442) (0.0633) (0.1558) (0.1685) 
competition -2.2875*** -1.6071*** -2.1111*** -2.0307*** 
 
(0.5457) (0.2540) (0.3439) (0.4534) 
state_owned -1.3870 0.6263*** -0.7144** 0.3335 
 (0.9724) (0.2266) (0.3430) (0.2140) 
partially_state_owned 0.0849 -0.2416 0.8404*** 0.4947* 
 (0.2757) (0.1572) (0.2710) (0.2622) 
government -0.8229*** -0.7926*** -0.7776*** -0.8243*** 
 
(0.1239) (0.1383) (0.1349) (0.1231) 
foreign -0.0637 -0.0492 -0.0370 -0.0462 
 
(0.1112) (0.0691) (0.1064) (0.1112) 
export -0.0448 -0.0442 -0.0469 -0.0363 
 
(0.0710) (0.0553) (0.0637) (0.0708) 
GDP per capita -0.6360* -0.4860*** -0.0956 -0.1330 
 (0.3700) (0.1731) (0.1302) (0.1842) 
GDP growth 0.0187* 0.0342*** -0.0009 0.0131* 
 
(0.0101) (0.0043) (0.0077) (0.0071) 
inflation 0.0030 0.0069** -0.0052 0.0127*** 
 
(0.0068) (0.0030) (0.0049) (0.0043) 
population 0.9687*** 0.5669*** 0.9855*** 0.4561*** 
 (0.2610) (0.0822) (0.1458) (0.1046) 
urban share 0.0200 0.0125 -0.0215** -0.0255* 
 
(0.0308) (0.0141) (0.0101) (0.0154) 
     Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Size Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     N 2786 2786 2786 2786 
pseudo R-sq 0.1449 0.1103 0.1156 0.1457 
Note: The regressions are run with ordered probit, which is based on standard maximum likelihood 
estimation. The dependent variable "Corruption" is based on answers to the question - Do firms like yours 
typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service providers to get connected to telephone? (1 = 
never, 2 = seldom, sometimes, frequently, mostly and 3 = always). Regressions include six dummies for firm 
size based upon employment and five dummies based upon sector of operations - manufacturing; agriculture, 
construction, service, and other. All the other variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. Standard errors are 
Huber-White standard errors allowing firms' error terms within country to be correlated for regressions. i.e., 
clustered errors at the country level. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 
1% level. 
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Table 7. Ordered Probit Regression with Institutional Control Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
regulatory substance -4.8071*** -4.1773*** -1.0795** -2.2333** -1.6755** -1.9012** 
 (0.9639) (1.0401) (0.5010) (0.9752) (0.8217) (0.8963) 
regulatory governance -6.7496*** -2.0931*** -1.7040*** -1.4625*** -1.2085** -3.1371*** 
 
(0.9105) (0.5782) (0.4928) (0.5480) (0.5670) (0.6618) 
fee 0.7660*** 1.0070*** 0.3667*** 0.8256*** 0.4768*** 0.4982*** 
 
(0.1560) (0.1869) (0.0641) (0.1691) (0.1443) (0.1493) 
competition -2.8178*** -1.9947*** -0.6913*** -1.0862*** -1.0110*** -1.1698*** 
 
(0.3264) (0.2893) (0.1092) (0.2788) (0.2246) (0.2267) 
state_owned -0.3166 0.5785*** 0.3009*** 1.0321*** 0.0773 0.5133*** 
 (0.2380) (0.1887) (0.0885) (0.1902) (0.2344) (0.1849) 
partially_state_owned 0.9778*** 0.2416 0.4086*** 0.4231** 0.6169*** 0.4574** 
 
(0.2195) (0.1760) (0.1345) (0.1930) (0.2013) (0.2107) 
government -0.8232*** -0.8113*** -0.8404*** -0.8221*** -0.8414*** -0.8454*** 
 
(0.0958) (0.0952) (0.0954) (0.0947) (0.0958) (0.0957) 
foreign -0.1101 -0.0754 -0.2777*** -0.0684 -0.1241 -0.0999 
 
(0.0922) (0.0932) (0.0250) (0.0937) (0.0928) (0.0931) 
export -0.0814 -0.0716 -0.0224 -0.0634 -0.0766 -0.0552 
 
(0.0548) (0.0547) (0.0211) (0.0546) (0.0545) (0.0546) 
GDP per capita -0.1523 0.0355 -0.0529 -0.0699 -0.0140 -0.3365** 
 (0.1512) (0.1795) (0.0515) (0.1527) (0.1544) (0.1486) 
GDP growth 0.0450*** 0.0526*** 0.0224*** 0.0559*** 0.0308*** 0.0333*** 
 
(0.0076) (0.0086) (0.0038) (0.0117) (0.0071) (0.0072) 
inflation 0.0115** 0.0089 0.0090*** 0.0226*** 0.0119** 0.0181*** 
 
(0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0031) (0.0069) (0.0048) (0.0054) 
population 0.8850*** 0.6917*** 0.1677*** 0.3886*** 0.5107*** 0.3955*** 
 (0.0928) (0.0894) (0.0620) (0.1162) (0.0770) (0.0860) 
urban share -0.0180 -0.0311** -0.0013 0.0008 -0.0143 0.0040 
 
(0.0119) (0.0137) (0.0071) (0.0124) (0.0105) (0.0120) 
voice and accountability -1.8915*** 
     
 
(0.2762) 
     
       political stability and  
 
-0.6038*** 
    absence of violence 
 
(0.1389) 
    
       government effectiveness 
  
-0.6131** 
   
   
(0.2906) 
   
       regulatory quality 
   
-1.0032*** 
  
    
(0.3874) 
  
       rule of law 
    
-1.1228*** 
 
     
(0.2548) 
 
       control of corruption 
     
-0.8403*** 
      
(0.2662) 
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Size Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2786 2786 2786 2786 2786 2786 
pseudo R-sq 0.1514 0.1441 0.1409 0.1412 0.1448 0.1423 
Note: The regressions are run with ordered probit, which is based on standard maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent variable 
"Corruption" is based on answers to the question - Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service 
providers to get connected to telephone? (1 = never, 2 = seldom, sometimes, frequently, mostly and 3 = always). Regressions include 
six dummies for firm size based upon employment and five dummies based upon sector of operations - manufacturing; agriculture, 
construction, service, and other. All the other variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. Standard errors are Huber-White standard 
errors allowing firms' error terms within country to be correlated for regressions. i.e., clustered errors at the country level. * significant  
at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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Table 8. Instrumental Variable Estimation 
  (1) (2) 
regulatory substance -1.2534** 
 
 
(0.4481) 
 regulatory  governance -0.8994** 
 
 
(0.2769) 
 regulation 
 
-1.9115** 
  
(0.4806) 
fee 0.3004*** 0.2650*** 
 
(0.0647) (0.0513) 
competition -0.6388*** -0.5746*** 
 
(0.1188) (0.0964) 
state_owned 0.4112** 0.4074** 
 
(0.1262) (0.1297) 
partially_state_owned 0.1086 0.0787 
 
(0.0575) (0.0414) 
government -0.2749*** -0.2752*** 
 
(0.0408) (0.0413) 
foreign -0.0414 -0.0447 
 
(0.0234) (0.0274) 
export -0.0259 -0.0280 
 
(0.0225) (0.0214) 
GDP per capita -0.1076 -0.1490*** 
 
(0.0525) (0.0176) 
GDP growth 0.0177*** 0.0169*** 
 
(0.0017) (0.0020) 
inflation 0.0064** 0.0071** 
 
(0.0023) (0.0016) 
population 0.2375*** 0.2150*** 
 
(0.0443) (0.0311) 
urban share -0.0067 -0.0032* 
 
(0.0041) (0.0013) 
   Industry Dummies Yes Yes 
Firm Size Dummies Yes Yes 
Sargan’s overidentification test (p-value) 0.1292 0.1511 
1st-stage F-test (p-value) 0.0000 0.0000 
1nd-stage adjusted R2 0.9854 0.9799 
N 2786 2786 
R-sq 0.2177 0.2164 
Note: The regressions are run with instrumental variables based on standard maximum likelihood estimation. The 
instruments in are the absolute value of a country’s latitude, financial depth, ideologies of voters, checks and 
balances in the governance, and ideological polarization.  The dependent variable "Corruption" is based on 
answers to the question - Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service 
providers to get connected to telephone? (1 = never, 2 = seldom, sometimes, frequently, mostly and 3 = always). 
Regressions include six dummies for firm size based upon employment and five dummies based upon sector of 
operations - manufacturing; agriculture, construction, service, and other. All the other variables are defined in 
Appendix Table 1. * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 9. Ordered Probit Regression with Interaction Terms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
regulatory substance -3.2964** -1.7024** -0.3610 -3.5498*** -3.2188** -1.3537 
 
(1.5257) (0.7664) (0.9560) (1.2903) (1.2854) (1.5358) 
regulatory governance -1.4467*** -0.1938 -0.4918 -2.6651*** -1.5036*** -9.4404*** 
 
(0.4634) (0.7944) (0.8120) (0.6068) (0.4187) (2.3290) 
fee 0.6888** 0.3704*** 0.0799 0.9992*** 0.9085*** 1.1076*** 
 
(0.2685) (0.1310) (0.1700) (0.2835) (0.2270) (0.2387) 
competition -1.4664*** -1.4679*** -1.2421*** -0.3208 -1.5023*** -1.0371*** 
 
(0.4131) (0.2735) (0.2901) (0.6126) (0.3574) (0.2808) 
state_owned 2.5279*** 0.7037*** 3.6529*** 0.8358*** 0.7751*** 0.4693** 
 
(0.9162) (0.2081) (0.8064) (0.2028) (0.2098) (0.2058) 
partially_state_owned 0.1623 3.8689** 4.6738*** 0.2020 0.2177 1.6421*** 
 
(0.2165) (1.7422) (1.7435) (0.2316) (0.2235) (0.6111) 
state_owned x regulatory substance -2.5361* 
 
-4.3702*** 
   
 
(1.4986) 
 
(1.2934) 
   partially_state_owned x 
 
-5.9323** -7.2146*** 
          regulatory subsance 
 
(2.6008) (2.5911) 
   competition x regulatory substance 
   
-3.1405* 
  
    
(1.6189) 
  high fee x regulatory substance 
    
-0.3543*** 
 
     
(0.1373) 
 government effectiveness 
     
-7.4092*** 
      
(2.2638) 
government effectiveness x 
     
5.6176*** 
       regulatory substance 
     
(1.7945) 
government -0.7890*** -0.8066*** -0.7989*** -0.7896*** -0.7947*** -0.7958*** 
 
(0.1347) (0.1367) (0.1372) (0.1352) (0.1330) (0.1366) 
foreign -0.0517 -0.0919 -0.0647 -0.0594 -0.0707 -0.0658 
 
(0.1064) (0.1106) (0.1060) (0.1104) (0.1105) (0.1066) 
export -0.0558 -0.0741 -0.0656 -0.0563 -0.0622 -0.0633 
 
(0.0633) (0.0625) (0.0617) (0.0640) (0.0644) (0.0630) 
GDP per capita -0.1589 -0.3768*** -0.4978*** -0.2964* -0.1660 -0.4089*** 
 
(0.1771) (0.1229) (0.1362) (0.1672) (0.1599) (0.1456) 
GDP growth 0.0333*** 0.0218*** 0.0138** 0.0433*** 0.0343*** 0.0709*** 
 
(0.0093) (0.0047) (0.0059) (0.0096) (0.0079) (0.0143) 
inflation 0.0079* 0.0119** 0.0149*** 0.0068 0.0066 0.0305*** 
 
(0.0044) (0.0047) (0.0051) (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0089) 
population 0.5833*** 0.6761*** 0.6251*** 0.7885*** 0.6085*** -0.2214 
 
(0.1298) (0.1213) (0.1224) (0.1597) (0.1137) (0.2596) 
urban share -0.0209 -0.0065 0.0026 -0.0171 -0.0199 0.0634*** 
 
(0.0139) (0.0092) (0.0102) (0.0133) (0.0125) (0.0240) 
       N 2786 2786 2786 2786 2786 2786 
pseudo R-sq 0.1089 0.1107 0.1121 0.1092 0.1092 0.1114 
Note: The regressions are run with ordered probit, which is based on standard maximum likelihood estimation. The dependent 
variable "Corruption" is based on answers to the question - Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to 
service providers to get connected to telephone? (1 = never, 2 = seldom, sometimes, frequently, mostly and 3 = always). Regressions 
include six dummies for firm size based upon employment and five dummies based upon sector of operations - manufacturing; 
agriculture, construction, service, and other. High Fee =1 if the tariff level is above the medium of the overall sample, and 0, 
otherwise. All the other variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. Standard errors are Huber-White standard errors allowing firms' 
error terms within country to be correlated for regressions. i.e., clustered errors at the country level. * significant at 10% level; ** 
significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Appendix Table 1. Variable Description and Sources  
Variable Name Definition Original Source 
 
Frequencies of bribery 
 
corruption 
 
Frequency of payments to telephone authorities 1=never 2=seldom, sometimes, 
frequently, or mostly, 3=always  
 
 
World Business 
Environment Survey 
(WBES) 
 
Regulatory governance index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regulatory 
governance 
 
independence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
clarity of roles 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
accountability 
 
 
 
 
 (G1+G2+G3+G4)/4 
 
 
a0*(a1+a2+a3)/3=G1 
 
a0=1 if the regulatory agency is separated from the utility and from the 
communications ministry started work; =0 otherwise. 
   
a1=1 if the regulator’s budget all comes from license fees or donors’ contributions; 
=0 if from the government budget; =0.5 if from both types of sources.  
 
a2 =1 if the minister or president cannot veto the regulator’s decision; =0 if 
otherwise.  
 
a3 =1 if the minister or president has not written policy guidelines during the past 
year; =0 if otherwise. 
 
(b1+b2+b3+b4+b5)/5=G2 
 
b1=1 if the regulator approves fixed-line local telephone prices; =0 if otherwise. 
 
b2=1 if the regulator grants licenses in fixed-line local telephony; =0 if otherwise. 
 
b3=1 if the regulator can decide how many licenses will be issued; =0 if otherwise. 
 
b4=1 if the regulator can assign spectrum use; =0 if otherwise. 
 
b5=1 if the regulator is in charge of resolving conflicts when two operators cannot 
agree on interconnection/access terms; =0 if otherwise. 
 
 (d1+d2)/2=G3 
 
d1=1 if the operator can appeal to the regulator when disagrees with regulators 
decision; =0 if otherwise. 
 
Calculated 
 
 
Calculated 
 
World Bank 
Telecommunications 
Regulation Survey (2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Calculated 
 
World Bank 
Telecommunications 
Regulation Survey (2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Calculated 
 
World Bank 
Telecommunications 
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Regulatory substance index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
transparency and 
participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regulatory  
substance 
 
tariff setting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
quality standards 
setting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
d2=1 if the other parties can appeal to the regulator when disagrees with regulators 
decision; =0 if otherwise. 
 
(c1+c2+c3+c4)/4=G4 
 
c1=1 if all regulatory meetings open to the public in practice; =0 if otherwise. 
 
c2=1 if regulatory decisions are publicly available; =0 if otherwise. 
 
c3=1 if regulator publish decisions in practice; =0 if otherwise. 
c4=1 if regulator publish explanations of decisions in practice; =0 if otherwise. 
 
 
(S1+S2+S3+S4)/4 
 
 
(h1+h2+h3+h4+h5)/5=S1 
 
h1=1 if the fixed-line local telephony prices are regulated; =0 if otherwise.  
 
h2=1 if the cellular telephony prices are regulated; =0 if otherwise.  
 
h3=1 if the domestic long-distance telephony prices are regulated; =0 if otherwise.  
 
h4=1 if the international long-distance telephony prices are regulated; =0 if 
otherwise.  
 
h5=1 if the internet service providers telephony prices are regulated; =0 if 
otherwise.  
 
(j1+j2+j3+j4+j5)/5=S2 
 
j1=1 if the law requires that all entrants receive the same technical terms and 
conditions for access/interconnection; =0 if otherwise. 
 
j2=1 if the law requires that all entrants receive the same prices for 
access/interconnection; =0 if otherwise. 
 
j3=1 if the regulator actually collects the performance indicator for call completion 
rates by operator; =0 if otherwise. 
Regulation Survey (2001) 
 
 
 
Calculated 
 
World Bank 
Telecommunications 
Regulation Survey (2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
Calculated 
 
 
Calculated 
 
World Bank 
Telecommunications 
Regulation Survey (2001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Calculated 
 
World Bank 
Telecommunications 
Regulation Survey (2001) 
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Tariff level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
accountants ratio 
 
 
periodic review 
 
 
 
fee 
 
subscription fee 
 
connection fee 
 
j4=1 if the regulator actually collects the performance indicator for faults/faults 
repair; =0 if otherwise. 
 
j5=1 if the regulator actually collects the performance indicator for geographical 
coverage rates; =0 if otherwise. 
 
S3 = the number of accountants divided by the telecommunications industry’s total 
revenue, and standardized to the country with the highest ratio. 
 
S4=1 there is a set period of time between regulator reviews; =0 if otherwise. 
 
 
 
=(subscription fee + connection fee)/2 
 
12*monthly subscription fee/GDP per capita 
 
12*connection fee/GDP per capita 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Calculated 
 
 
World Bank 
Telecommunications 
Regulation Survey (2001) 
 
Calculated 
 
Calculated from ITU 
Statistical Year Book 2002 
 
 
Competition 
 
competition 
 
 
The logarithm of number of operators 
 
 
World Telecommunication 
Regulatory Database 
published annually on ITU 
website 
 
State-owned 
 
state-owned 
 
=1 if fixed line telecommunications operators are wholly state-owned; =0 if 
othersies. 
 
 
Idem 
 
 partially_state_owned =1 if fixed line telecommunications operators are partially state-owned; =0 if 
otherwise. 
Idem 
 
 
 
fully privatized 
 
=1 if fixed line telecommunications operators are fully privatized; =0 otherwise. 
 
Idem 
 
 
 
Firm-level Control Variables: 
 
Ownership government = percentage of government ownership. WBES 
 
 foreign =percentage of foreign ownership. Idem 
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Firm Size smallest 
small 
medium 
large 
largest 
 
=1 if fewer than 9 employees; =0 if otherwise. 
=1 if between 10 and 49 employees; =0 if otherwise. 
=1 if between  50 and 99 employees; =0 if otherwise. 
=1 if between 100 and 249 employees; =0 if otherwise. 
=1 if between 250 and 499 employees; =0 if otherwise. 
The omitted variable is the dummy variable=1 if there are more than 500 
employees and 0 otherwise. 
 
Idem 
 
Exports export 1=yes 0=no Idem 
 
Sector manufacturing 1=yes 0=no Idem 
 
 service 1=yes 0=no Idem 
 
 agriculture 1=yes 0=no Idem 
 
 construction 1=yes 0=no Idem 
 
Country-level Control Variables: 
 
GDP per capita GDP per capita GDP per capita in PPP adjusted international dollars, averaged over 1995-1999 World development 
indicators from IMF 
 
GDP growth GDP growth Growth rate of GDP, averaged over 1995-1999 Idem 
 
Inflation 
 
inflation Average between 1995-1999 International 
financial statistics 
(IFS) 
 
Population population The natural logarithm of total population World Development 
Indicators & Global 
Development 
Finance from the 
World Bank 
 
Urban Share 
 
 
urban share Urban population as a percentage of total population. World Development 
Indicators & Global 
Development 
Finance from the 
World Bank 
Other Macro Control 
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Variables: 
Fuel, ores, and metal exports 
 
 
 
 
Democracy index 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Government expenditure 
 
fuel_ores_metal 
 
 
 
 
democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
government expenditure 
 
 
[―Fuel exports (% of merchandise exports)‖ + ―Ores and metals exports (% of 
merchandise exports)‖] * [―Merchandise Exports (current price)‖/ GDP (current 
price)] 
 
 
An index with a range from 1 to 7. Calculated by taking the average of LIEC & 
EIEC. The high the index means greater level of democracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Government Expenditure as a % of GDP 
 
 
World Bank 
 
 
 
 
Thorsten Beck, 
George Clarke, 
Alberto Groff, 
Philip Keefer, and 
Patrick Walsh, 
2001. "New tools in 
comparative 
political economy: 
The Database of 
Political 
Institutions." 15:1, 
165-176 
(September), World 
Bank Economic 
Review. 
 
 
World Bank 
 
Political right 
 
 
political right Index between 1 and 7 with higher values indicating greater democracy Freedom House 
(2000) 
 
 
Institutional Variables 
-- Country-specific variables that are used as Control Variables26: 
 
Voice and accountability voice and accountability Measuring the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media. 
 
The Worldwide 
Governance 
Indicators (WGI) 
project 
 
Political stability and absence of political stability Measuring perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized Idem 
                                                 
26 Definition for the country governance indicator measurement is directly from Melissa Thomas, ―What do the worldwide governance indicators measure?‖ 2007, SSRN 
working paper: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1007527 
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violence or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence 
and terrorism 
 
 
Government effectiveness government effectiveness Measuring the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the 
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's 
commitment to such policies 
 
Idem 
 
Regulatory quality regulation quality Measuring the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private 
sector development 
 
Idem 
 
Control of corruption control of corruption Measuring the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests 
Idem 
 
    
Rule of law rule of low Measuring the extent to which agents have confidence in and 
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence 
 
Idem 
 
    
Instrumental Variables 
 
   
Geographic Location abs_latitude Logarithm of absolute value of latitude Vikipedia.com 
 
Policy Suppliers ideology 
 
Following Li and Xu (2002), this variable is constructed as an index of principal 
components indicating the ideological inclination of legislature, lagged one year. 
World Bank 
Database of 
Political 
Institutions, 
DPI2010. 
 
 party polarization 
 
The maximum difference in orientation measures (Left=-1, Center=0, Right=1) 
between the chief executive’s party’s value and the values of the three largest 
government parties and the largest opposition party. The minimum is 0, and the 
maximum is 2. 
 
Idem 
 balances_and_checks 
 
Following Li and Xu (2002), this variable is constructed as the logarithm of the 
number of veto players, ranges from 1 to 4. 
 
Idem 
Financial Depth financial depth Following Li and Xu (2002), this variable is constructed as an index of principal World Development 
 47 
components of three variables, M2/GDP, stock market capitalization/GDP, and 
bank assets/GDP. Each component variable is standardized to have mean o and 
variance 1.   
Indicators & Global 
Development 
Finance from the 
World Bank 
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Appendix Table 2. OLS Regression: Determinants of Corporate Corruption  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
regulatory substance -0.5354*** -0.5718** 
 
-1.9291*** 
 
 (0.1367) (0.2671) 
 
(0.6079) 
 regulatory governance 
  
-0.6004** -0.7427*** 
 
 
  
(0.2385) (0.1771) 
 regulation 
    
-2.0406*** 
 
    
(0.4524) 
fee 0.2618*** 0.1401* 0.1513*** 0.3806*** 0.2727*** 
 (0.0403) (0.0718) (0.0467) (0.0986) (0.0597) 
competition -0.1102 -0.2389* -0.3106*** -0.7817*** -0.5967*** 
 (0.0704) (0.1347) (0.0508) (0.1749) (0.1068) 
state_owned 0.3826*** 0.2436*** 0.3357*** 0.4169*** 0.4167*** 
 (0.0857) (0.0839) (0.1254) (0.1094) (0.1160) 
partially_state_owned 0.2128** 0.2083* 0.0162 0.1781** 0.0804 
 (0.0920) (0.1106) (0.0744) (0.0850) (0.0577) 
government -0.3091*** -0.3056*** -0.2774*** -0.2741*** -0.2750*** 
 (0.0352) (0.0339) (0.0340) (0.0331) (0.0334) 
foreign -0.0982** -0.0930** -0.0542 -0.0338 -0.0442 
 (0.0427) (0.0431) (0.0472) (0.0469) (0.0467) 
export -0.0449* -0.0422 -0.0308 -0.0209 -0.0281 
 (0.0262) (0.0255) (0.0276) (0.0284) (0.0274) 
GDP per capita 
 
-0.1153** -0.2214*** -0.0106 -0.1486*** 
 
 
(0.0456) (0.0358) (0.0669) (0.0234) 
GDP growth 
 
0.0010 0.0120*** 0.0195*** 0.0174*** 
 
 
(0.0061) (0.0025) (0.0039) (0.0034) 
inflation 
 
0.0005 0.0063*** 0.0048** 0.0074*** 
 
 
(0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0023) 
population 
 
0.0833 0.1451*** 0.2887*** 0.2196*** 
 
 
(0.0532) (0.0286) (0.0574) (0.0334) 
urban share 
 
-0.0018 0.0045* -0.0148*** -0.0035** 
  
(0.0040) (0.0026) (0.0053) (0.0016) 
      Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Size Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      N 3731 3731 2786 2786 2786 
R-sq 0.1774 0.2146 0.2108 0.2190 0.2165 
Note: The regressions are run based on ordinary least square estimation (OLS). The dependent variable "Corruption" is 
based on answers to the question - Do firms like yours typically need to make extra, unofficial payments to service 
providers to get connected to telephone? (1 = never, 2 = seldom, sometimes, frequently, mostly and 3 = always). 
Regressions include six dummies for firm size based upon employment and five dummies based upon sector of operations 
- manufacturing; agriculture, construction, service, and other. All the other variables are defined in Appendix Table 1. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are Huber-White standard errors allowing firms' error terms within 
country to be correlated for regressions. i.e., clustered errors at the country level. * significant at 10% level; ** significant  
at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
